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Robert Ross
In the history of South Africa, the Griqua have a symbolic role far
outweighing their actual importance in the development of the country As
perhaps the richest, as well as the fairest, coloured group within South Africa
their outcasting represente the decision of the white power block not to '
assimilate blacks en masse into the ranks of the governors, but rather to
maintain a somewhat mythical white supremacy. (l) This paper is an attempt to
describe the defeat of the Griqua Captaincy of Philippolis, which was established
to the north of the Orange River in the 1820s and which remained a refuge for
those forced out of the Cape Colony by the increasing racial pressures there
Finally, the spread of these same pressures dislodged the Captaincy so that it
was driven to trek en bloc over the Drakensberg into Nomansland, subsequentlv
renamed East Griqualand. y
It is argued that it was the consciousness that the surrounding whites
had of the Griqua as ethnically different from themselves that caused them to
look upon the Griqua community as a competitor for the rieh sneep lands of the
Southern Free State rather than accept the considerable number of individual
Griquas who conformed to all other criteria of "civilization" as equal members
of the larger social entity that ruled South Africa. This competition became
increasingly keen, in a process that has a number of parallels elsewhere in the
development of colonial societies, after the growth of a widespread and
moderately large-scale expansion within and around the Griqua community
Through this expansion, a considerable degree of interdependence was established
so that the political power of the whites allowed them to manipulate the
relationship until they vrere able to force the Griqua into a Situation where
there remained only two equally invidious choices. Either they could watch
their society disintegrate around them and expect that, after their unitv had
gone, those who survived with some degree of wealth intact would be eliminated
slowly and individually, or they could attempt to transplant their communitv
into the new and superficially attractive soil of Nomansland. They chose the
latter.
On a simple level, the explanation for the Griqua decline 13 readily
apparent. The development of the Afrikaner republice and the establishment by
Moshoeshoe, of hegemony over many of the disparate Sotho-Tswana groups of the
Caledon River valley and the Drakensberg foothills altered the political
environment in Transorangia as the whole scale of political interaction
increased dramatically. Thus, without any diminution in their own resources -
in fact, as will be nhown, the opposite was the case - the Griqua of Philippolis
ceased to be able to determine the course of events. This was aggravated by
the fact that they lay athwart the path of the northward expansion of the Boers.
From the foundation of Philippolis in the mid-1820s onwards, the Trekboers had
been croccing the Orange in search of water and pasturage for their herds, to
escape the devastations of springbok treks, locusts and drought. (2) Initially,
there was conflict betveen the trekkers and the Griqua, but this settled down
through the ISJOn, and by 1840 a modus vivendi had been established. (j) They
lived much the carac sort of life as the Griqua, being nomadic pastoralists, and
they recognized the authority of the Griqua over the land in which they were
forced to live, paying rent for the use of farms that v/as at first intermittent
but became increaoingly permanent as a considerable community of Boers built up
along the Riet Hiver. By 1842, the emigrant Boers claimed to have paid the
Griqua fractionally over £5,000 for the hire of some 105 farms, for periods
ranging up to 45 years. (4) Even so, the Boers never admitted any Griqua
authority over their persons, and indeed it is by no means certain whether they
admitted that of anyone apart from their own leader, Michiel Oberholster. (5)
The tenaionn between Boer and Griqua, which were always present in the
relationship of the two distinct groups utilizing the same natural resources,
were very considerably exacerbated after 1842, when the British annexation of
ITatal cauned militant republicans to trek back over the Drakensberg into the
northern Pree State and the couthern Transvaal. Increasingly these voortrekkers
came into conflict with the Griqua, as men like Jan Koek and Jan Mocke attempted
to include all the land north of the Orange River, thus including the Griqua
territory, in an Afrikaner republic. In this they were thwarted primarily
because the British, in treaty relationship with the Griqua, became increasingly
embroiled. Once it became evident that the British were prepared to use troops
to quell Boer unrest north of the Orange, which was the case after 1845 when a
detachment v;as sent up to Colesberg in case of need, the Griqua, in accordance
with their agreements with the British, had the confidence to assert their
authority over the so-called British subjects - in other words, the
voortrekkers - within their boundaries. In consequence, in 1845, British troops
were once more sucked north of the Orange and, after a short skirmish at
Zwartkoppies, the dissident Boers were driven out of Griqua territory, into the
Transvaal. (6)
In many ways the v/hole episode would appear to have been a success for
the Griqua, as it led to the expulsion of their main rivals for control over the
southern Pree State. In fact, the reverse v/as to prove the case. In order to
lessen the chances of their being forced to move north again, the British not
only established a resident north of the Orange - in itself an almost certain
guarantee of further entanglements, especially as the post v/as long held by a
man of almost unrelieved incompetence, Major Henry Warden (?) - but also imposed
a settlement of affairs betv/een the Boers and the Griqua that was to lead to
continual trouble. By the Maitland Treaty of 1846 (8), the Griqua territory was
divided into tv/o sections. In the northern part Griqua were to be allowed to
lease out land, v/hile the area south of the line was to be reserved for Griqua
alone. In principle, this seems to have been a reasonable measure, ensuring that
part at any rate of the Griqua country remained sacrosanct, for they could not
hope to retain control of the considerable territory, stretching north to the
Modder River, that they had claimed but could not by any means utilize. In the
event, considerable problems arose from the fact that the boundaries of the
Inalienable Territory in no v/ay coincided with the division betv/een Griqua and
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Boer areas, as marked out in the agreement between Adam Kok and Oberholster of
1840. (9) The consequence was that some 59% (85 out of 14?) of those farms that
had boen let vere within the Inalienable Territory, while only 40% (58 out of
146) of the farms in the Alienable Territory had been leased. (10) The problem
was made worse when Sir Harry Smith set up the Orange River Sovereignty two
years later. By threatening to hang them all (il), hè extorted from Adam Kok
and his council an agreement whereby such farms as were leased by the Griqua
for 40 years or more, 42 in all, were to be converted to freehold, and then
proceeded to treat all the farms within the Alienable Territory, another 104,
of which 16 had been let for shorter periods, as falling within this category,
thereby depriving the Griqua of a very considerable area of land. (12) V/hen,
some 6 years later, the British government, in one of the reversals of policy
that bedevilled its actions in South Africa, scuttled out of the Orange River
Sovereignty, the Griqua once again lost out. Not only did they fail to recover
the farms that they had been swindled out of, being liberally insulted by the
British Resident into the bargain (13), but also such land as was sold by Griqua
passed out of the jurisdiction of Adam Kok to that of the Orange Pree State,
in accordance with an agreement that was not published until 1857. (14)
The line of argument that they lost their land, and consequently their
power, through the doublé dealing of the British government has considerable
attractiono. It was, for instance, believed by Adam Kok himself, who dragged
it out on various more or less suitable occasions. (15) An analytic view of
the uholc episode perhaps would rather stress the need of the British to switch
collaborators when it was proved that the Griqua were unable to control the
area north of the Orange to any degree, and lay less emphacis on British perfidy
than Kol: and nis mission apologistn (l6), but the general effect would be the
same. ïïltimately, it v/as the control that the whites possessed over the
Political Kingdom and exercised in the way outlined above that led to the
Griqua defeat, but such an explanation by itself is too simple. If either the
growth of new polities that might, in a Social Darwinian sense, be seen to be
competing vith the Griqua or the loss of land and power owing to the machinations
and mictakes of politicians v/ere held to account for the failure of the Griqua
captaincy and its trek into Uomansland, then it would be easy to predict that
the period after 1854 would be one of decline on all fronts. In fact, except
in so far as diplomatic weight was concerned, the opposite was the case. It
is thus necessary to view the effects of the loss of land in a far more
sophisticated framework if any sense is to be made of the developments as a
v;hole.
'•ƒ. B. Philip, the last minister to the Griqua at Philippolis, later
recorded hls memories of life in and around the town in the last years of its
occupation. !le wrote as follows:
"About the tims this movenent was necessitated,
the people v/ere in a prosperous state; they had
titles to their farms, in which they had built
nubctantial cottages and out-buildings; orchards,
stockod with good fruit trees, garden grounds and
land for cultivation were in many cases enclosed
vith stone valls; good stone kraals and one or
two dame were to be found on most farms; troops
of fron twenty to one hundred horses, about the
same number of cattle, and hundredo of well-bred
woolled fiheep, were running on these farms, and
many a man brought nis ten, fifteen, twenty, and
twenty five bales of v/ool for sale at once;
while the shopkeepers found them as good
customers for clothing, groceries, saddlery,
carts, and furniture as any of the Boers. Of
course there were many poor people, whose
poverty had been brought on by their own
laziness, pride and drunkenness." (l?)
The Impression he gives is substantiated by the actual figures for the
.ubscription tfïhe church, which run as follows: 1856 £581; 1057 £457; 1858
£511: W £58/1; 1860 £612 (18) - and by a letter from Philippolis after the
Grioun had left, which considered that several of the 6 stores in the torn were
likely to fold w ao "Merchants and others are now feeling the truth that the
Griqua nation have left, and where many shops here took a fev months ago ca|h. _
sales of £15 or £20 per diem. they now take about as many Shillings. (19) _It is
tr^ Tthat the takingc of shops during 1861 would have been increased by Griqua
using the proceeds of their final winding up to provision themselves for the
trek, but the general picture is nevertheless clear.
There would thus scein to exist the considerable paradox that _
simultaneously with the very considerable düainution of power of tne Griqua
Captainoy of Philippolic lts wealth increased to a level unprecedented in the
CTOUB'S admittedlY short history. In order to resolve this seeming contradiction,group s acmxteay „nort nib ou^y. Griqua wealth that mushroomedit is necessary to exainine closely tne oases oj. ^j.±^ua,
from around 1850.
Primarily this new prosperity was founded on wool. Hobart Houghton
has pointed out that "the economie impact of international markets was carned
ÏÏto ïbe interior not in the waggons of the Voortrekkers but upon the backs of
rnïrino sheep" (20), and it would appear to have reached the Griqua as soon as
it Sd their Boer neighbours. It is true that some Griquas denved considerable
profit from variouc subsidiary activities. There is a certain anount of evidence
thlt they conducted a moderately large trade in horses which were driven as far
afsarotseland, and, as they lived on the northern lomts of the area that is
free from horse-sickness, such activity is inherently likely. (21)
, a certain income was no doubt derived from trading and transport
As earlv as 1845 the community had as many as 50 waggons and received
for their use by the British forces who were coming to protect them. There
also much evidence of the Griqua role in the opening of the interior of
Southern Africa, particularly in the penetration of ïïgamiland and Barotseland
from the south, and such activity was, of course, undertaken primanly in search
of ivorv and other trade goods. Though most of the individuals in question
airaear to have been baseless or to have hailed from Griquatown (2J), some at
least of the prominent Griqua of Philippolis also took part. (24) llevertheless,
it v/as from woolled sheep that the Griqua gained their considerable income. In
early°1056 some 200 bales of wool v/ere sent south, at a value of about £2,000,
and it would appear that the total rose considerably after that. (25)
SimultaneouBly, of course, the Pree State Boers were also tuming over to merino
sheep but there is nothing to suggest that they reacted appreciably faster than
the Griqua to the new opportunities. (26)
ïTow this raises the very considerable problem as to how the Griqua were
able to buy the merino ramo from which to breed their flocks. It should be
pointed out that the Griqua were not dependent on their flocks and herds for
subsistence, as to a large extent they lived off the game that still abounded in
the Free State. Indeed, their continual demand for ammunition supplies, and the
repeated attempts of the Orange Free State government to persuade the Cape
Colony not to allow this, may have been occasioned by the desire to maintain
control over the herds of game and thus allow the build-up of sizable flocks. (27)
In other words, arme and ammunition were seen as much, if not more, the means
of production as the means of destruction. It is also +™0 -t-v, .. ^
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establishment of the Orange River Sovereignty in 1848. Another 88 were lost to
them by the arrangement of Sir Harry Smith in that year, and there were also
some 63 sold during the subsequent seven years. It would not, however, appear
that there v;as great land shortage among the Griqua: 122 farms remained,
mainly in the vicinity of Philippolis itself, and generally in the south-east of
the old Griqua domain. In any case, much of the land that was hired or sold to
the Boers had never been utilized anyway, but was merely part of the Griqua
territorial claims that had been agreed to from c. 18JO onwards. It may be,
however, that such land would have been taken into production by younger sons
and immigrants from the colony, and that the lack of such land built up pressures
within the colony that had some part in impelling the Griqua to trek to
ITomansland.
Secondly, it can be shown that many individuals who sold or hired land
had accesc to other farms on which they could run those sheep that - according
to our hypothesis - they bought with the proceeds of their land sales. Horeover
it is highly likely that the sheep were allowed to run on the farms of relatives'
or friends. This certainly appears to have been the case in East Griqualand
af ter the trek. Thus, the fact that a man did not formally possess a farm need
not have precluded his making a considerable income from the profits of sheep-
farming.
If, then, there was a certain rationale for all Griqua to alienate a
certain section of their land to acquire the capital with which to utilize the
rest, it should also be realized that the society was not economically
homogeneous. ïïerc again data are, to all intents and purposes, non-existent, and
a fair degree of a priori reasoning unfortunately becomes necessary to elucidate
varioua events, but the diotinction that was frequently drawn between the Griqua -
"an indolent people neither understanding nor caring for the value of land" -
and the Bastards - "the more civilised portion ... of colonial descent" (34) _
would appear to gain such validity as it has from nascent economie stratification
rather than from racial divergence. It can thus be assumed that the great
expansion of the Griqua cash economy was attended by the development of sizable
wealth differentials within the community, although it would be a mistake to
consider that they had been non-existent earlier. The vagaries of disease,
pasture, v/ar and personality would bring this about. It is thus highly likely
that come of the Griqua who held land would, from time to time, become destitute,
or, at any rate, would not be able to live at the level of considerable display
to which the community as a whole was becoming accustomed. (35) it is, therefore,
to be cxpected that they would seil their land, which, in the circumstances and
given the availability of credit, they could only do to whites. Thus, yet more
of the Griqua gebied would be alienated and would never return to Griqua hands.
In thi s way, the contradiction betvreen the homogeneity necessary to preserve the
integrity of the Griqua power and the heterogeneity of economie status
Lsequcnt upon the development of large-scale cash farming led further to the
'Sion and destntction of Griqua power.
c on
erosi
V/hen the material is shorn of its details and reduced to a pattern, it
would appear that there were three stages in the process vhereby the introduction
of a large-scale cash nexus north of the Orange led to the Griqua being forced
to leave that region.
1) Uith the grovrth of new economie opportunities, a quick response was
made, at any rate by some individuals within the society, leading in all
probability to a considorable increase in internal stratification, which divcrged
Gomcwliat from the pre-existing patterns. The Griqua were, moreover, dependent
on the white-doininated econony of the Cape Colony, to which they rjay be seen to
bc in the ponition of satellite, and their own economy owed its origin to a
large degrec to the surrounding Afrikaner population, who both provided capital,
albeit unwittingly, and formed a Community large enough to persuo.de Cape
nerchantrj to extend their operations northward.
2) Thin initial influence gave the white power bloc, both of the Cape
Colony,where the government was becoming increasingly conscious of its reliance
on local agricultural and commercial interests (36)> and of the Orange Free
State, which wan dominated by the Griqua1s main competitors (37). a lever
wherewith to exercise over the Griqua an influence that was increased by their
own. rcluctance to jeopardize their newly acquired Standard of living. In any
case tacy were too weak in numbers to cope effectively in any military sense.
Thus the whites v/ere able to put through the various measures that successively
deprived the Griqua of large parts of their land, while the only Opposition that
was presented to them was but ineffective invective.
5) In time, the Situation becane so intolerable for the inass of the Griqua
that, a^ainst the advice of the missionaries (30) and to the detriment of their
imnDdiuto economie situo.tion, they trekked over the Drakensberg. Only in this
way could they maintain themselves as the political unit they had been for the
prcviou;: '•'ƒ_> years, and no doubt they recognized that, without some such
political bloc, the wealth of those who had it would be slowly whittled away.
The alternative to trekking could only have been to remain behind in
the Froc State and watch the degradation of many Griqua while a proportion
remainc-d we3,lthy. They understood that the relation of imperium in imperio in
which they stood to the Free State was inherently unstable, and the timing of
their exodus is probably explained as much by the failure of Sir George Grey's
federation scheme of 1859 as by the publication of the secret clauses of the
Bloemfonte.in convention. Undoubtedly, they realized that acceptancc into the
Afrikaner community of the Orange Free State was iinpossible. Sir Charles V/arren
describcd colonial opinion accurately when hè claimed that, athough the
Griqua "... is just as white in many cases as the darker Boer and quite as much
civilizcd, yet hè must be classed among the blacks and have no right to land". (39)
Griqua society had been founded and had prospered as a refuge from the growing
discrirnination in the Colony. Despite its economie flowering, it feil when that
society once more engulfed it.
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